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Introduction
When Alan Greenspan was appointed chairman of the Federal
Reserve in 1987, the United States was running a current account
deficit of 3.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This was
considered to be very large figure at the time. During the next three
years, the current account deficit declined substantially, and by fourth
quarter of 2004, it had shrunk to 1 percent of GDP. In 1991, and
partially because of foreign contributions to the financing of the Gulf
War, the United States posted a current account surplus of 0.7 percent
of GDP. By the second quarter of 1992, the current account was again
in deficit. Since then the deficit has grown steadily to its current level
of approximately 6 percent of GDP.   
A number of analysts have become increasingly alarmed by this very
large and growing external imbalance. Some authors have argued that
by relying on foreign central banks’ purchases of government securities,
the United States has become vulnerable to changes in expectations and
economic sentiments. If capital flowing into the United States were to
stop suddenly, it is argued, there would be a large depreciation of the
dollar and, as a consequence, higher inflationary pressures. This would
force the Federal Reserve to act decisively, hiking the federal funds rate
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205significantly.1 This, the story goes, would result in a recession in the
United States and in a slowdown of the world economy.2 The belief
that a significant external adjustment and a large decline in the dollar
are unavoidable is based on reasoning along the following lines: At
approximately 6 percent of GDP, the U.S. current account deficit is
clearly unsustainable; thus, in the next few years, the deficit has to be
cut approximately in half. In a recent paper, Mussa has said:
[T]here is probably a practical upper limit for the U.S. net
external liabilities at something less than 100 percent of U.S.
GDP and, accordingly...current account deficits of 5 percent or
more of U.S. GDP are not indefinitely sustainable. (Mussa,
2004, p 114).
From policy and empirical points of view, an important question is
whether these developments—a significant real depreciation, higher
interest rates, and a sharp decline in GDP growth—are indeed neces-
sary outcomes of a current account reversal of the type many analysts
forecast for the United States during the next few years. In principle,
the real consequences of a current account reversal will depend on a
number of factors, including whether the reversal is abrupt or gradual,
whether the country is large or small, and whether the country is open
to the rest of the world. According to standard theory, gradual reduc-
tions in the current account deficit do not have to be costly. In
addition, current account adjustments in large and very open coun-
tries are expected to have different consequences than in smaller and
more closed economies.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the international evidence on
current account reversals during the period 1971-2001. Although the
U.S. case is unique, an analysis of the international experience will
provide some light on the likely nature of a future U.S. current
account adjustment. In particular, this research will provide informa-
tion on whether a significant current account reversal would entail a
decline in growth and, thus, an increase in unemployment.3 Previous
studies on the (real) consequences of current account reversals have
generated conflicting results. After analyzing the evidence from a large
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 number of countries, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) concluded that
major current account reversals have not been costly. According to
them, “reversals…are not systematically associated with a growth slow-
down” (p. 303). Frankel and Cavallo (2004), on the other hand,
concluded that sudden stops of capital inflows (a phenomenon closely
related to reversals) have resulted in growth slowdown.4 In this paper,
I analyze several aspects of current account reversals, including:5
• The incidence of current account reversals in different regions
and groups of countries.
• The relationship between reversals and “sudden stops” of
capital inflows.
• The relation between current account reversals and exchange
rate depreciation.
• The relation between current account reversals and interest rates.
• The relation between current account reversals and inflation.
• The factors determining the probability of a country experienc-
ing a current account reversal.
• The costs—in terms of growth slowdown—of current
account reversals.
In analyzing these issues, I have relied on two complementary statis-
tical approaches. First, I use non-parametric tests to analyze the
incidence and main characteristics of current account reversals. And
second, I use panel regression-based analyses to estimate the probabil-
ity of experiencing a current account reversal, and the cost of such
reversal in terms of (short-term) declines in GDP growth. Although the
data set covers all regions in the world, throughout most of the paper I
emphasize the experiences of large countries and industrial countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section,
I provide some background information on the U.S. current account.
The analysis deals both with historical trends, as well as with recent
developments. I show that there are no modern historical precedents of
The End of Large Current Account Deficits, 1970-2002: 
Are There Lessons for the United States? 207
 a large country, such as the United States, running persistent and very
large current account deficits. In the third section, I use a cross-country
data set to analyze the international evidence on current account rever-
sals. I use non-parametric tests to analyze the behavior of interest rates,
exchange rates, terms of trade, and economic growth in the period
following a current account reversal. I use two alternative definitions of
reversals, and I investigate whether the speed of the adjustment matters.
In the fourth section, I use panel regression techniques to investigate
two important issues: (a) what determines the probability that a
country will experience a reversal; and (b) whether countries that have
experienced reversals have faced real costs in the form of a decline in the
rate of GDP growth. In this analysis, I explicitly deal with potential
endogeneity problems by estimating an instrumental variables version
of a treatment regression. In the fifth section, I discuss the U.S. current
account adjustment of 1987-1991. Although this episode does not
qualify as a “reversal,” as defined in this paper, it is the closest the
United States has been to a major current account reduction in modern
times. Finally, in the sixth section, I present some concluding remarks.
The paper also has a statistical appendix.
The U.S. current account imbalance: An unprecedented story
In this section, I provide some background information on the
evolution of the U.S. current account during the last 30 years. The
analysis is divided in three parts. First, I deal with long-term trends,
and I discuss briefly the relation between the current account and the
real exchange rate. Second, I focus on the more recent period, and I
discuss the evolution and funding of the current account and its
components during the last few years. Finally, I take a comparative
perspective, and I compare the recent evolution of the U.S. current
account and net international investment position with that of other
countries. I show that no other large country in modern times has run
a persistently large current account deficit of a magnitude (measured
as percentage of GDP) similar to that posted by the United States.
This lack of other historical cases makes the analysis of the current
U.S. situation particularly interesting and difficult. 
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 A long-run perspective
In Chart 1, I present quarterly data for the U.S. current account
balance as a percentage of GDP for the period 1973-2004.6 I also
include data on the evolution of the Federal Reserve’s trade-weighted
index of the real exchange rate (RER) of the U.S. dollar (an increase
in the RER index represents a real exchange rate appreciation).7
Several interesting features emerge from this chart: 
• First, it shows that deficits have become increasingly large since 1992. 
• Second, Chart 1 shows that for the first decade of floating
exchange rates (1973-1982), the United States ran, on average,
a small current account surplus of 0.04 percent of GDP. In
contrast, for the period 1983-2004 the mean current account
balance has been a deficit of 2.4 percent of GDP. 
• Chart 1 also shows that during the period under consideration,
the RER index experienced significant gyrations. 
• Finally, Chart 1 shows a pattern of negative correlation between
the trade-weighted real value of the dollar and the current account
balance. Periods of strong dollar have tended to coincide with
periods of (larger) current account deficits. Although the relation
is not one-to-one, the degree of synchronicity between the two
variables is quite high: the contemporaneous coefficient of corre-
lation between the (log of the) RER index and the current account
balance is -0.53; the highest correlation of coefficient is obtained
when the log of the RER is lagged three quarters (-0.60). 
In Chart 2, I disaggregate the data on the current account into four
categories: (a) the balance of trade of goods and services as a percent-
age of GDP; (b) the balance of trade in (nonfinancial) services as a
percentage of GDP; (c) the income account, also as a percentage of
GDP; and (d) the transfers account as a percentage of GDP. As may
be seen in panel A, large and persistent trade deficits preceded in time
the era of large current account deficits. Already in the late 1970s, the
trade account was negative, and since mid-1976, it has had only one
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 surplus quarter (1992Q2).8 Panel B shows that since 1996, the surplus
in (nonfinancial) services has declined steadily; in 2004 it was only 0.3
percent of GDP. As Panel C shows, the income account has been posi-
tive throughout the 1973-2004 period. To some extent, this is
surprising since for quite some years now the U.S. international invest-
ment position has been negative (that is, the United States has been a
net debtor). The reason for the positive income account is that the
return on U.S. assets held by foreigners has been systematically  lower
than the return on foreign assets in the hands of U.S. nationals.
Finally, panel D shows that, with the exception of one quarter, the
transfers account has been negative since 1973; during the last few
years it has been stable at approximately 0.7 percent of GDP.
Recent imbalances
In Table 1, I present data on the current account as a percentage of
GDP and its financing for the period 1990-2004. As may be seen
during the last few years, the nature of external financing has changed
significantly. Since 2002, net FDI flows have been negative; this
contrasts with the 1997-2001 period when FDI flow contributed in
an important way to deficit financing. Also, after four years on net
positive equity flows (1998-2002), these became negative in 2003-
2004. As the figures in Table 1 show, during 2003 and 2004, the U.S.
current account deficit was fully financed through net fixed income
flows and, in particular, through official foreign purchases of govern-
ment securities.9
In Chart 3, I present the evolution of the U.S. net international
investment position (NIIP) as percentage of GDP. As may be seen,
this has become increasingly negative: in 2004, U.S. net international
liabilities reached 29 percent of GDP. An important feature of the
NIIP is that gross U.S. international assets and gross U.S. interna-
tional liabilities are held in different currencies. While more than 70
percent of gross foreign assets held by U.S. nationals are denominated
in foreign currency, approximately 95 percent of gross U.S. liabilities
in hands of foreigners are denominated in U.S. dollars. This means
that net liabilities as a percentage of GDP are subject to “valuation
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neffects” stemming from changes in the value of the dollar. Dollar
depreciation reduces the value of net liabilities; a dollar appreciation,
on the other hand, increases the dollar value of U.S. net liabilities.
Because of this valuation effect, the deterioration of the U.S. NIIP
during 2002-2004 was significantly smaller than the accumulated
current account deficit during those two years (see Table 2 for details). 
An important policy question refers to the “reasonable” long-run
equilibrium value of the ratio of U.S. net international liabilities to
GDP; the higher this ratio, the higher will be the “sustainable” current
account deficit. According to some authors, the current ratio of almost
30 percent of GDP is excessive, while others believe that a NIIP to
GDP ratio of up to 50 percent would be reasonable.10
From an accounting point of view, the current account is the differ-
ence between savings and investment. A number of authors have
argued that a worsening of a current account balance that stems from
an increase in investment is very different from one that results from
a decline in national savings. Some have gone as far as arguing that
very large deficits in the current account “don’t matter,” as long as
they are the result of higher (private sector) investment (Corden,
1994). Chart 4 shows that the recent deterioration of the U.S. current
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 account has been largely the result of a decline in national savings
and, in particular, of public and household savings. Some analysts
have argued that the recent decline in U.S. savings has been, at least
partially, the result of the Fed’s policy of (very) low interest rates.
According to this view, low interest rates have helped fuel very rapid
increases in housing prices and a concomitant process of “mortgage
extraction.” This has resulted in a decline in household savings to
historically low levels. This, plus the decline in government savings,
is behind the increase in the current account deficit.11
A simple implication of this trend—and one that is emphasized by
most authors—is that an improvement in the U.S. current account
situation not only will imply a RER adjustment; it also will require
an increase in the national savings ratio and, in particular, in house-
hold savings. Symmetrically, a correction of current global imbalances
also will require a decline in Europe’s and Japan’s savings rates and/or
an increase in their investment rates.12
The U.S. current account deficit in international perspective 
In Table 3, I present data on the distribution of current account
balances in the world economy, as well as in six groups of nations—
Industrialized, Latin America, Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Eastern
Europe—for the period 1970-2001. As may be seen, at almost 6
percent of GDP, the U.S. deficit is very large from a historical and
comparative perspective. It is in the top decile of deficits distribution
for all industrial countries in the first 30 years of floating. As the data
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Table 2
U.S. Net International Investment Position and Current
Acccount Deficit, 1998-2004
($ Billion)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
NIIP 900.0 775.5 1388.7 1889.7 2233.0 2430.7 --
Change in NIIP 79.3 -124.5 613.3 500.9 343.3 197.7 --
Current account deficit 209.5 296.8 413.4 385.7 473.9 530.7 665.7
Valuation changes 130.2 421.3 -199.8 -115.2 130.6 333.0 --
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis The End of Large Current Account Deficits, 1970-2002: 
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Distribution of Current Account Deficits by Region, 1970-2001
Region Mean Median 1st Perc. 1st Quartile  3rd Quartile  9th Perc.
A: 1970-2001
Industrialized countries 0.6 0.7 -3.8 -1.6 3.0 4.8
Latin Am. and Caribbean 5.4 4.1 -2.5 1.1 8.0 16.9
Asia 3.0 2.7 -7.1 -0.6 6.3 11.3
Africa 6.3 5.3 -3.4 1.2 9.9 16.9
Middle East 0.0 1.4 -18.8 -5.0 6.4 13.6
Eastern Europe 3.9 3.0 -2.4 0.3 6.1 10.7
Total 3.9 3.3 -5.0 -0.1 7.1 13.1
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators
in Table 3 suggest, the U.S. looks more like a Latin American or Asian
country than like an industrial nation. 
Since 1970, the U.S. has been the only large industrial country that
has run current account deficits in excess of 5 percent. This reflects the
unique position that the United States has in the international finan-
cial system, where its assets have been in high demand, allowing it to
run high and persistent deficits. On the other hand, this fact also
suggests that the United States is moving into uncharted waters. As
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004, 2005), among others, have pointed out,
 if the deficit continues at its current level, in 25 years the U.S. net
international liabilities will surpass the levels observed by any country
in modern times. 
During the last 30 years, only small industrial countries have had
current account deficits in excess of 5 percent of GDP: Australia,
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, New
Zealand, Norway, and Portugal. What is even more striking is that very
few countries—either industrial or emerging—have had persistently
high current account deficits for more than five years. In Table 4, I
present a list of countries with persistently high current account deficits
for 1970-2001. In constructing this table, I define a country as having
a “high deficit” if, in a particular year, its current account deficit is in its
region’s 10th decile.13 I then defined a “persistently high-deficit
country,” as a country with a high deficit (as defined above) for at least
five consecutive years.14 As may be seen in Table 4, the list of persist-
ently high-deficit countries is extremely short, and none of these
countries is large. This illustrates the fact that, historically, periods of
high current account imbalances have tended to be short-lived and
have been followed by periods of current account adjustments. 
In Table 5, I present data on net international liabilities as a
percentage of GDP for a group of advanced countries that historically
have had a large negative NIIP position.15 As may be seen, the picture
that emerges from this table is quite different than that in Table 4 on
current account deficits. Indeed, a number of advanced nations have
had—and continue to have—a significantly larger net international
liabilities position than the United States. This suggests that, at least
in principle, the U.S. NIIP could continue to deteriorate for some
time into the future. However, even if this does happen, at some
point this process would have to end, and the U.S. net international
liabilities position as percentage of GDP would have to stabilize. It
makes a big difference, however, at what level U.S. net international
liabilities do stabilize. For example, if in the steady state, foreigners
are willing to hold the equivalent of 35 percent of U.S. GDP in the
form of net U.S. assets, the United States could sustain a current
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Table 4
List of Countries with Persistently High Current Account
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Table 5
Net Stock of Liabilities: United States and other Industrial
Countries, Selected Years
(Percent of GDP)
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
Australia -- -- 47.4 55.1 65.2 59.1
Canada 34.7 36.3 38.0 42.4 30.6 20.6
Denmark -- -- -- 26.5 21.5 13.0
Finland 14.6 19.0 29.2 42.3 58.2 35.9
Iceland -- -- 48.2 49.8 55.5 66.0
New Zealand -- -- 88.7 76.6 120.8 131.0
Sweden -- 20.9 26.6 41.9 36.7 26.5
United States -12.9 -1.3 4.2 6.2 14.1 22.1
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001)account deficit of (only) 2.1 percent of GDP.16 If, on the other hand,
foreigners’ net demand for U.S. assets grows to 60 percent of GDP—
which, as shown in Table 5, is approximately the level of (net) foreign
holdings of Australian assets—the U.S. sustainable current account
deficit would be 3.6 percent of GDP. Moreover, if foreigners’ are
willing to hold (net) U.S. assets for the equivalent of 100 percent of
GDP—a figure that Mussa (2004) considers implausible—the
sustainable U.S. current account deficit can be as high as 6 percent of
GDP, approximately its current level. Since there are no historical
precedents for a large advanced nation running persistently large
deficits, it is extremely difficult to have a clear idea on what will be
the actual evolution of foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets.
It is worth noting that an analysis for a longer period of time
confirms the view that the recent magnitude of the current account
deficit has no historical precedent in the United States. According to
Backus and Lambert (2005), the United States ran a current account
deficit of 5 percent of GDP in 1815, and a somewhat smaller but
persistent deficit during the 1830s and 1870s. Greenspan (2004, p.
6) has pointed out that the large deficits during the 19th century were
financed with capital flows related to “specific major development
projects (such as railroads).” 
On current account reversals: An international comparative analysis
Most recent analyses have concluded that the current level of the
U.S. current account deficit is unsustainable in the long run. Even
under an optimistic scenario, where foreigners’ demand for U.S. secu-
rities doubles from its current level, there would have to be a
significant decline in the deficit. For example, if the (negative) NIIP
were to go from its current level of 30 percent of GDP to 60 percent
of GDP, the sustainable current account deficit would be 3.6 percent.
This is almost three percentage points below its current level. In
reality, however, the adjustment is likely to be even larger. The reason
for this is that in order for the NIIP to go from -30 percent to -60
percent of GDP in a reasonable period of time, the current account
deficit needs to overshoot its steady-state level by a significant margin.
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 In Edwards (2005a), I present a model where the NIIP reaches 60
percent of GDP after 7 years; in this case, the current account deficit
continues to increase, until it reaches a peak of 7.1 percent of GDP.
It then declines until it converges to 3.6 percent of GDP. According
to this work, and other recent models summarized in Table 6, at some
point in time, the United States will undergo a significant current
account adjustment. Although no one seems to know when this
adjustment will actually take place, almost every analyst agrees that it
will have to take place. 
A key question is what will be the nature of this adjustment process?
In this section, I address this issue by analyzing the international
experience with current account reversals in the period 1970-2001.
Although the U.S. case is unique—both because of the size of its
economy and because the dollar is the main vehicle currency in the
world—an analysis of the international experience will provide some
light on the likely nature of the adjustment. A particularly important
question is whether this adjustment will entail real costs in the form
of lower growth and higher unemployment. 
In Table 7, I present a summary of previous studies on the real
consequences of current account reversals and “sudden stops” in
capital inflows (a phenomenon closely related to reversals). As may be
seen, these studies have used different samples, different time periods,
and slightly different definitions of reversals. These studies also have
reached different results. For instance, after analyzing the evidence
from a large number of countries, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000)
concluded that major current account reversals have not been costly.
According to them, “reversals…are not systematically associated with
a growth slowdown” (p. 303). Frankel and Cavallo (2004) concluded
that sudden stops of capital inflows (a phenomenon closely related to
reversals) have resulted in growth slowdown, while Crocke, Kamin,
and Leduc (2005) argue that there is no evidence suggesting that
reversals historically have been associated with growth slowdown (see
Table 7 for details).17
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 Authors Methodology Main Assumptions Main Results
Mann (1999) • Model tracks U.S.  • Income elasticity of imports (1.7) • In base case scenario, the NIIP
NIIP through time. exceeds income elasticity of  becomes increasingly negative
exports (1.0). and the CA is unsustainable in
the medium run.
• Analyzes trajectory of NIIP  • Base case scenario assumes no  • Under RER depreciation 
under three scenarios and  RER adjustment for the USD. scenario, CA is within
asks whether these trajectories  sustainable ranges even in a 
are sustainable. 10-year long horizon.
• Elasticities-based adjustment  • A USD adjustment scenario • Under structural adjustment,
mechanism. assumes an RER depreciation  CA deficit is 3 percent
of 25 percent. in a 10-year horizon, 
if the global economy has 
• Considers two scenarios  • A structural adjustment scenario high performance.
for global growth. assumes that exports' elasticity 
increases to 1.3.
Obstfeld and • Develops and calibrates  • Elasticity of substitution between • Base case result indicates that 
Rogoff (2000) optimizing model of small  tradables and nontradables is an elimination of the CA 
economy, with two goods:  assumed to be equal to one. deficit will imply a 16 percent
tradable and nontradable. RER depreciation, and a  
12 percent nominal depreciation
of the USD.
• Output is exogenous; prices  • Assumes a 6 percent nominal  • Assuming a share of tradables
are assumed to be flexible;  interest rate, and a NIIP  equal to 15percent, results
monetary policy stabilizes  of 20 percent of GDP. in a RER depreciation
the price level. of 20 percent.
• Analyzes the effect on RER of  • Tradables output is assumed • The effect on the nominal
an exogenous shock that results to be 25 percent of GDP. value of the USD could
in a reduction of the CA deficit be even higher if the
of 4.4 percent of GDP. • Assumes that full-employment  reduction in the CA is very rapid.
is maintained.
O’Neill and  • Analyzes the trajectory of NIIP • Analyzes the rates of return • It is unlikely that United States 
Hatzious as a percentage of GDP. obtained by foreign owners  will be able to continue to attract 
(2002) of U.S. assets. foreign purchasing for its
assets at observed low rates of 
• Argues that at the observed  • Argues that, with the exception return. Thus, the U.S. CA 
levels of CA deficits, the NIIP  of FDI, these rates of return have deficit is clearly unsustainable.
is moving toward the levels of  been modest.
Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand. It is difficult to  • Shows that FDI has declined • A return to sustainability
believe that this is possible for  significantly as a source of (2 percent of GDP) will imply
a large country such as the   financing of the U.S. CA deficit. a depreciation of the RER
United States. of as much as 43 percent.
• Estimates “required” RER
depreciation in order to bring 
CA deficit to 2 percent and 
NIIP not to surpass 40 percent.
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Table 6
U.S. Current Account Adjustment and the U.S. Dollar: 
Selected Studies, 1999-2005Authors Methodology Main Assumptions Main Results
Wren-Lewis • Calibrates a partial equilibrium  • To determine initial conditions, • CA deficit of 2 percent of  
(2004) model to obtain set of bilateral  author estimates “underlying”  GDP is consistent with a 
RER consistent with attaining  (or cycle-adjusted) CA balances. yen/dollar rate of 88, and a
certain (exogenous) current  dollar/euro of 1.18.
account deficits. • Considers three possible  
long-term scenarios: 1 percent,  • If there is a positive technological
• No attempt is made to  2 percent, and 3 percent CA deficit. shock, the “sustainable” CA 
determine what is the sustainable deficit may be higher. This
level of the U.S. current account.  • Three-good partial equilibrium would be consistent a yen/
model (including a nontraded) dollar rate of 89-100 and a 
of small economy. dollar/euro rate of 1.11-1.19.
• Considers the effect of a U.S. 
fiscal shock and of a U.S.  • Elasticities and other parameter • Estimates that if China has a 
technological shock. values taken from regression CA surplus of 1 percent of 
analysis and from OECD data set. of GDP, the Rmb/USD 
would be 6.71.
Benassy- • Estimates econometrically RER  • Model estimated simultaneously • The extent of misalignment
Quere and  path consistent with nontradable  for 15 currencies. of the different currencies
others (2004) equilibrium. depends on how broad is the 
adjustment.
• The RER is assumed to depend  • Data on NFA obtained from
on the country's net foreign  Lane and Milessi-Ferreti (2004) • Using the USD as numeraire,
assets (NFA) position and on  and relative productivities  estimates that in 2003, the 
relative productivity. obtained as ratio of CPI to PPI. euro was undervalued between
1.2 percent and 7.6 percent.
• No attempt is made to impose 
external equilibrium condition. • Using the USD as numeraire, 
estimates that in 2001, the
• Results provided for two cases:   yen was undervalued between
USD as numeraire and euro  14.3 percent and 22.1 percent.
as numeraire. 
Mussa (2004) • Analyzes trajectory of NIIP and  • Based on results from large • Relative to its value in mid- 
argues that it is unlikely that it  econometric models, assumes 2004, Mussa calculates that 
will continue to grow at current  that a 1 percent reduction of  RER will have to depreciate
pace. If it did, it would reach  the U.S. CA deficit is associated  another 20 percent to achieve a 
100 percent of GDP. with a 10 percent depreciation  long-term CA deficit of 2%.
of the RER.
• Argues that challenge is for RER • Discusses policies that will
adjustment to be gradual and  assist the adjustment process:
that it does not disrupt growth. (a) Fiscal consolidation in the
United States will help keep
• Argues that fiscal adjustment in  U.S. demand growing below 
the United States is necessary for  the pace of output growth.
smooth correction of imbalances. (b) Monetary policy in
Europe and Japan should be
• No attempt is made at calculating more expansive.
the “outer limit” of U.S. NIIP.
• Concludes that “some” 
• Analyzes the RER adjustment  international policy cooperation
compatible with a gradual  is likely to help the 
reduction of the CA deficit to  adjustment process.
2 percent of GDP and a NIIP 
between 40 percent and 
50 percent.
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Table 6 (cont.)
Authors Methodology Main Assumptions Main Results
O’Neill and  • Update of O'Neill and Hatzious • Estimates a trade balance equation • A reduction of the CA deficit 
Hatzious (2002) model. and uses the coefficients to  to 3 percent would imply RER 
(2004) compute the “required” RER  depreciation of the order of 
• Analyzes the trajectory of NIIP  depreciation to achieve different 21.6 percent to 23.6 percent.
as a percentage of GDP and finds  CA adjustment targets.
that path is not sustainable. • A reduction of the CA deficit
• Trade equation also includes to 2 percent would imply RER
• Introduces the role of productivity foreign and U.S. demand growth. depreciation of the order
gains to original framework. of 32.1 percent to 34.1percent.
• Analyzes the composition of  • An elimination of the CA 
capital flows into the United States. deficit to 2 percent would imply
RER depreciation of the order
• Incorporates the role of  of 53 percent to 55 percent. 
valuation effects. (Notice that these figures are
signifigantly higher than 
those estimated by Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 2004).
Obstfeld and • Extension of the Obstfeld-Rogoff • Ratio of CA deficit to tradables • Assuming constant output, 
Rogoff (2002) model to a two-country  is 25%; CA deficit is 5% of GDP . an elimination of the CA
(2004) world. deficit implies RER
• Output is exogenously given in depreciation between 14.7 
• Terms of trade are now endogenous. both countries. percent and 33.6 percent.
• Incorporates the effects of valuation • NIIP is 20 percent of GDP. • If tradables output increases
effects of exchange rate changes  by 20%, the RER depreciation
on NIIP. • Home country produces   ranges from 9.8 percent
22 percent of world tradables. to to 22.5 percent.
• Exercise assumes an elimination 
of the CA deficit; that is a  • Simulation is done for alternative • If there is a permanent increase
reduction in 5 percent of GDP. values of elasticities, and under  in military expenditure, 
different assumptions regarding  the RER depreciation ranges
changes in tradables output and  from 16.0 percent to 
military spending. 36.1 percent
Roubini and  • Uses macro aggregate model to  • First scenario considers • In first scenario, CA deficit
Setser (2004) project the U.S. current account.   a constant RER dollar. 13 percent of GDP in 2012.
• Imposes exogenous assumptions  • Second scenario considers a • In second scenario, CA deficit
on RER and analyzes CA path. constant trade deficit at 5 percent 9 percent of GDP in 2012.
of GDP, and a RER depreciation 
of approximately 7 percent. • In third scenario, the NIIP
stabilizes at approximately
• Third scenario considers a faster  55 percent of GDP and the 
rate of growth of exports, and  CA deficit declines gradually,
substantial (50 percent)   reaching 4.3 percent of 
depreciation. GDP in 2012.
This scenario also assumes a 
gradual elimination (by 2012) 
of the fiscal deficit.The End of Large Current Account Deficits, 1970-2002: 
Are There Lessons for the United States? 223
Table 6 (cont.)
Authors Methodology Main Assumptions Main Results
Blanchard, • Uses portfolio model to analyze  • Considers dynamics  • Estimates range of required 
Giavazzi, and U.S. current account behavior. of adjustment. U.S. dollar real depreciation
Sa (2005) (today). After incorporating
• Assumes changes in portfolio  • Considers valuation effects of  the role of valuation effects,
preferences in world economy.   changes in the U.S. dollar. the range is estimated to be
between 40 percent and 90
• Simulates model under certain  percent real depreciation.
assumptions for values of key 
parameters (elasticities, portfolio 
shares, and other).  
• The question asked is, What is 
the required (real) depreciation 
of the U.S. dollar to eliminate 
the current account deficit?    
In this section, I analyze several aspects of current account
reversals, including:18
• The incidence of current account reversals in different regions
and groups of countries.
• The relationship between reversals and “sudden stops” of 
capital inflows.
• The relationship between current account reversals and
exchange rate depreciation.
• The relationship between current account reversals and interest rates.
• The relationship between current account reversals and inflation.
• The factors determining the probability of a country experienc-
ing a current account reversal.
• The costs—in terms of growth slowdown—of current
account reversals.
In analyzing these issues, I rely on two complementary statistical
approaches. First, I use nonparametric tests to analyze the incidence
and main characteristics of current account reversals. And second, I
use panel regression-based analyses to estimate the probability of
experiencing a current account reversal, and the cost of such reversal,
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.in terms of short-term declines in output growth. Although the data
set covers all regions in the world, in the discussion presented in this
section, and in an effort to shed light on the U.S. case, I emphasize
the experience of large countries and industrial countries.
Current account reversals during 1970-2001: The international evidence  
I consider two definitions of current account reversals. The first one
considers a reduction in the current account deficit of at least 4 percent
of GDP in a one-year period, and an accumulated reduction of at least
5 percent of GDP in three years. This definition is called “reversal 4
percent.”The second definition considers a reduction in the current
account deficit of at least 2 percent of GDP in one year, with an accu-
mulated reduction in three years of 5 percent of GDP. This definition
is called “reversal 2 percent.”19 In the reversal 4 percent definition, the
adjustment is front-loaded, while in the first one, it is more evenly
distributed through time. In Chart 5, I present data on the number of
reversals by country group for the years 1971-2001.
In Table 8, I present data on the incidence for both definitions of
current account reversals for the complete sample as well as for six
groups of countries. As may be seen, for the overall sample, the inci-
dence of reversals is 6.5 percent and 9.4 percent, for reversal 4 percent
and reversal 2 percent, respectively. The incidence of reversals among
the industrial countries is much smaller, however, at 1.3 percent and
3.3 percent for reversal 4 percent and reversal 2 percent. The Pearson-
χ2 and F-tests reported in Table 8 indicate that the hypothesis of
equal incidence of reversals across regions is rejected strongly. 
The advanced countries that have experienced current account
reversal 4 percent are: 
• Greece (1986), 
• Italy (1975), 
• Malta (1997),
• New Zealand (1975),  
The End of Large Current Account Deficits, 1970-2002: 
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 • Norway (1978, 1989), 
• Portugal (1982, 1983, 1985). 
The industrial (or advanced) countries that have experienced
current account reversal 2 percent are: 
• Denmark (1997),
• Finland (1976, 1977, 1993, 1994), 
• Greece (1986),
• Iceland (1993), 
• Ireland (1982),
• Italy (1975), 
• Malta (1997), 
• New Zealand (1976, 1986, 1988), 
• Norway (1978, 1979, 1980, 1989), 
• Portugal (1977, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986),
• Spain (1977),
• Sweden (1994). 
With the exception of Italy, all of these countries are very small
indeed; this underlies the point that there are no historical precedents
of large countries undergoing profound current account adjustments.
As pointed out above, this implies that the results reported in this
paper on current account reversals should be interpreted with a grain
of salt, and should not be mechanically extended to the case of the
United States.
The data analysis presented has distinguished countries by their
stage of development and geographical location. An alternative way
of dividing the sample—and one that is particularly relevant for the
discussion of possible lessons for the United States—is by country
230 Sebastian Edwards
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size. I define “large countries” as those having a GDP in the top 25
percent of the distribution in 1995 (according to this criterion, there
are 44 large countries in the sample). The incidence of reversal 4
percent among large countries is 3.9 percent for 1971-2001; the inci-
dence of reversal 2 percent among large countries is 6.3 percent.
Current account reversals and sudden stops of capital inflows
Since the mid-1990s, a number of authors have analyzed episodes
of “sudden stops” of capital inflows.20 Although from an analytical
perspective sudden stops and current account reversals are closely
related, there is no reason for this relationship to be one-to-one. If
there are changes in international reserves, it is perfectly possible
that a country that suffers a sudden stop does not experience, at the
same time, a current account reversal. In countries with floating
exchange rates, however, changes in international reserves tend to
be relatively small, and the relation between sudden stops and rever-
sals should be stronger. 
Table 8
Incidence of Current Account Reversals, 1970-2001
(Percentages)
Region Type of Reversal
Reversal 4 Percent Reversal 2 Percent
Industrial countries 1.3 3.3
Latin America and Caribbean 5.5 9.4
Asia 8.2 10.7
Africa 8.8 11.9
Middle East 10.4 14.9
Eastern Europe 5.9 7.3
Total 6.5 9.4
Pearson
Uncorrected chi2 (5) 33.8 33.7
Design-based F(5, 12500) 6.8 6.7
P-value 0.00 0.00
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators234 Sebastian Edwards
I defined a “sudden stop” episode as an abrupt and major reduction
in capital inflows to a country that up to that time had been receiv-
ing large volumes of foreign capital. More specifically, an episode is
defined as a sudden stop if the following two conditions are met: (1)
the country in question must have received an inflow of capital (rela-
tive to GDP) larger than its region’s third quartile during the two
years prior to the sudden stop, and (2) net capital inflows must have
declined by at least 5 percent of GDP in one year.21
In Table 9, I present data on the incidence of sudden stops and
current account reversals (I use both definitions of reversal) for three
samples: (a) large countries, defined as those countries whose GDP is
in the top quartile of the distribution; (b) industrial countries; and (c)
the complete sample. Table 9 shows that for the complete sample,
37.7 percent of countries subject to a sudden stop also faced a rever-
sal 4 percent current account reversal. At the same time, 34.9 percent
of those with reversal 4 percent also experienced (in the same year) a
sudden stop of capital inflows. Panel C also shows that 45 percent of
countries subject to a sudden stop faced a reversal 4 percent current
account reversal. Also, 30.5 percent of those with reversal 2 percent
experienced (in the same year) a sudden stop of capital inflows. The
χ2 tests reported in Table 9 indicate that for all countries in the
sample, the hypothesis of independence between reversals and sudden
stops is rejected. The results for industrial and large countries are
quite similar. For both samples, the χ2 test indicates that the null
hypothesis of independence between the two phenomena cannot be
rejected. An analysis of the lead-lag structure of reversals and sudden
stops suggest that sudden stops tend to occur either before or at the
same time—that is, during the same year—as current account rever-
sals. Indeed, according to a series of nonparametric χ2 tests, it is
possible to reject the hypothesis that current account reversals precede
sudden stops.
Current account reversals and exchange rates
An important policy question—and one that is particularly relevant
within the context of current policy debate in the United States—is
whether current account reversals historically have been associated
 with large exchange rate depreciations.22 In Chart 6, I present the
evolution of the median nominal exchange rate (with respect to the
U.S. dollar) in reversal countries. These data are presented as an index
with a value of 100 the year of the reversal. The data are centered on
the year of the reversal; they go from three years prior to the current
account reversal to three years after the reversals. In this chart, a lower
value of the index reflects a nominal depreciation. As may be seen, in
all three samples—large, industrial, and all countries—there is a
nominal depreciation in the period surrounding the reversal. These
depreciations range from 14 percent to 40 percent, depending on the
sample and the definition of reversal. In most emerging countries, a
large depreciation tends to have a short-run contractionary effect on
GDP growth. The reason for this is that in most of these countries,
many debts are expressed in foreign currency. Thus, currency depre-
ciation tends to have a “balance sheet” effect, increasing the domestic
currency value of these debts.23
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Table 9
Incidence of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops,
1970-2001
(Percentages)
Country Group Reversal 4 Percent Reversal 2 Percent
A. Large countries
Reversal | sudden 22.2 28.9




Reversal | sudden 9.5 14.3




Reversal | sudden 37.7 45.0
Sudden | reversal 34.9 30.5
χ2(1) 275.1 274.7
P-value 0.00 0.00
x | y denotes the probability of occurrence of x given the occurrence of y.
Source: Author's elaboration based on World Development Indicators236 Sebastian Edwards
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Chart 7 shows the behavior of the (median) real effective exchange
rate index. As before, a decline in the index is a real depreciation. As
may be seen, for the “large countries” sample, there is a real exchange
rate depreciation the year of the reversal, with respect to the year
before the adjustment. Moreover, for this sample of large countries,
the RER continues to depreciate during the next three years. The
accumulated (median) RER depreciation between years -1 and +3 is
8.7 percent for the reversal 4 percent definition of reversal; it is 11.8
percent for reversal 2 percent. Chart 6 also shows that there is an RER
depreciation in the “industrial countries” sample. In this case,
however, there is an overshooting, and the maximum depreciation is
achieved one year after the reversal—it is 7.2 percent for reversal 4
percent and 5.2 percent for reversal 2 percent episodes. Finally, the
last panel in Chart 6 shows that for the “all countries” sample, there
are no significant changes in (median) RER behavior in the +/-3 years
that surround a current account reversal.
For comparison purposes, and in order to gain further insights, I
constructed a dataset for a “control group” of countries that have not
experienced a current account reversal. I then computed a battery of
χ2 tests for the equality of distributions (Kruskal-Wallis tests) between
the reversal countries and the control group.24 The results from these
tests are presented in Table 10 (p-values in parentheses).25 As may be
seen, these χ2 tests show that nominal exchange rates have behaved
differently in the reversal countries and in the control group coun-
tries—this is the case independently of the reversal group one looks
at. They also show that, for the “large countries” sample, RERs have
behaved differently in the reversal and control group countries. 
The exchange rate adjustments in the reversal countries reported in
Charts 6 and 7 are relatively small when compared with the “required”
exchange rate depreciation that has been calculated in a number of
studies, including those summarized in Table 6. Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2004), for example, estimate that eliminating the U.S. current
account deficit would imply a (real) depreciation of between 16
percent and 36 percent. Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) have 
estimated a required depreciation of the U.S. trade-weighted dollar in
 238 Sebastian Edwards
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Index: Reversal Year = 100Country Group One Year Before and  Three Years Before
Reversal Year and Three Years After Reversal
Reversal 4 Percent Reversal 2 Percent Reversal 4 Percent Reversal 2 Percent
Nominal Exchange Rate
Large  countries 6.58 9.45 15.60 14.79
(0.01)* (0.00)* (0.00)* (0.01)*
Industrial countries 2.03 2.98 3.53 2.38
(0.15) (0.08)* (0.06)* (0.12)
All countries 26.17 44.61 56.50 28.20
(0.00)* (0.00)* (0.00)* (0.00)*
Effective Real Exchange Rate
Large  countries 5.73 6.01 9.56 5.62
(0.01)* (0.01)* (0.00)* (0.02)*
Industrial countries 1.56 0.21 0.11 1.90
(0.21) (0.65) (0.74) (0.17)
All countries 7.26 13.30 13.84 6.36
(0.00)* (0.00)* (0.00)* (0.01)*
Inflation Rate
Large  countries 4.88 1.29 0.05 14.19
(0.03)* (0.26) (0.82) (0.00)*
Industrial countries 5.45 1.59 0.29 8.18
(0.02)* (0.21) (0.59) (0.00)*
All countries 18.73 0.99 5.13 16.67
(0.00)* (0.32) (0.02)* (0.00)*
Nominal Interest Rate
Large countries 14.72 4.37 2.83 3.94
(0.00)* (0.04)* (0.09)* (0.05)*
Industrial countries 1.03 0.07 6.61 6.97
(0.31) (0.80) (0.01)* (0.00)*
All countries 36.87 21.05 14.94 15.02
(0.00)* (0.00)* (0.00)* (0.00)*
Per Capita GDP Growth
Large countries 15.11 9.87 2.08 20.74
(0.00)* (0.00)* (0.15) (0.00)*
Industrial countries 1.90 0.15 3.26 2.95
(0.17) (0.70) (0.07)* (0.09)
All countries 13.71 6.14 10.37 19.74
(0.00)* (0.01)* (0.00)* (0.00)*
Null Hypothesis: Data from treatment and control countries have been drawn from the same population.
* Significant at least at 10 percent.
Table 10
Kruskal-Wallis Test
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the order of 40 percent. There are many possible reasons for these
differences, including that the United States is a very large country,
while the countries that have experienced reversals are much smaller.
Also, the values of elasticities and other parameters may be different in
the United States than in the average reversal country. Yet another
possibility has to do with the level of economic activity and aggregate
demand. Most recent models on the U.S. current account assume that
the economy stays in a “full employment” path. It is possible, however,
that the countries that historically have experienced reversals also have
gone through economic slowdowns, and that a reduction in aggregate
demand contributed to the adjustment effort.
Current account reversals, interest rates, and inflation
A number of analysts have argued that one of the most serious
consequences of a rapid current account reversal (and the concomi-
tant nominal depreciation) is its effect on inflationary pressures and
inflation. In this section, I investigate this issue by analyzing the
behavior of inflation and nominal (lending) interest rates in the
period surrounding reversal episodes.26 Chart 8 depicts data on
(median) inflation rates for the three reversal samples; Chart 9, on the
other hand, has data on nominal interest rates. As may be seen from
Chart 8, in the “large countries” sample, there is a sharp increase in
the (median) rate of inflation the year of the reversal. Although it
stabilizes somewhat, inflation stays above its pre-reversal level for the
three years after the current account adjustment. Chart 8 also shows
that there is an increase in inflation after the reversals. In the indus-
trial countries, however, the pattern is somewhat different from that
of large countries; also, they exhibit some differences in behavior
across the two definitions of reversals.
The data in Chart 9 on interest rates shows that in the three
samples, and for both definitions of reversal, nominal interest rates
are higher three years after the reversal than three years prior to the
reversal. For the large countries, the increase is rather gradual. Inter-
est rates begin to increase two years before the reversal. For reversal 2
percent, interest rates peak one year after the crisis; for the reversal 4
 Chart 8
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percent definition, they peak three years after. In the industrial coun-
tries, on the other hand, there are no discernible changes in interest
rates before the reversal; there is, however, a significant jump during
the first year after the crisis. Finally, the data for all countries show a
steady increase in nominal interest rates in the year surrounding the
reversals. Between three years prior to a reversal 4 percent episode and
one year after the reversal, median interest rates increased by 310 basis
points in large countries, 570 basis points in industrial countries, and
240 basis points in all countries. Under most circumstances, increases
in interest rates of this magnitude are likely to have a negative effect
on aggregate demand and economic activity. In the fourth section of
this paper, I deal with the effects of reversals on economic growth.  
The Kruskal-Wallis tests in Table 10 indicate that, for the short-
time horizon, changes in inflation are significantly higher in the
reversal countries than in the control group. These tests also show
that for large countries, changes in interest rates are significantly
different in the reversal and control groups.
The probability of experiencing current account reversals
In order to understand further the forces behind current account
reversals, I estimated a number of panel equations on the probability
of experiencing a reversal. The empirical model is given by equations
(1) and (2):
(1) ρtj =
0,   otherwise.
(2) ρt
*
j  = αωtj + εtj.
Variable ρtj is a dummy variable that takes a value of one, if country
j in period t experienced a current account reversal, and zero if the
country did not experience a reversal. According to equation (2),









j, in turn, is
assumed to depend linearly on vector ωtj. The error term εtj is given
by a variance component model: εtj= ν j + µtj. ν j is iid with zero mean
and variance σ2
v; µtjis normally distributed with zero mean and vari-
ance σµ
2 = 1. The data set used covers 87 countries for the 1970-2001
period; not every country has data for every year, however. See the
Appendix for exact data definition and data sources. 
In determining the specification of this probit model, I followed the
literature on external crises, and I included the following covariates.27
(a) The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP lagged one
period. (b) A sudden stop dummy that takes the value of one if the
country in question experienced a sudden stop in the previous year.
(c) An index that measures the relative occurrence of sudden stops in
the country’s region (excluding the country itself) during that partic-
ular year. This variable captures the effect of “regional contagion.” (d)
The one-year lagged gross external debt over GDP ratio. Ideally, one
would want to have the net debt; however, for most countries, there
are no data on net liabilities. (e) The one-year lagged rate of growth
of domestic credit. (f) The lagged ratio of the country’s fiscal deficit
relative to GDP. (g) The country’s initial GDP per capita (in logs). 
The results obtained from the estimation of this variance-compo-
nent probit model for a sample of large countries are presented in
Table 11; as before, I have defined “large” as having a GDP in the top
25 percent of its distribution. The results obtained are quite satisfac-
tory; the vast majority of coefficients have the expected sign, and
many of them are significant at conventional levels.28The results may
be summarized as follows: Larger (lagged) current account deficits
increase the probability of a reversal, as does a (lagged) sudden stop of
capital inflows. Countries with higher GDP per capita have a lower
probability of a reversal. The results do not provide strong support for
the contagion hypothesis: The variable that measures the incidence of
sudden stops in the county’s region is significant in only one of the
equations (its sign is always positive, however). There is also evidence
that an increase in a country’s (gross) external debt increases the prob-
 ability of reversals. Although the United States is a very special case,
the results reported in Table 11 provide some support to the idea that
during the last few years, the probability of the United States experi-
encing a reversal has increased. 
Current account reversals and growth
One of the most important questions regarding a (possible) current
account reversal in the United States is whether it will affect negatively
economic activity and growth. In this section, I investigate the relation
between current account reversals and real economic performance
using the comparative data set presented above. I am particularly inter-
ested in analyzing the following issues: (a) historically, have current
account adjustments had an effect on GDP growth, (b) have the
effects of reversals depended on the structural characteristics of the
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Table 11
Current Account Reversals: Random Effects Probit Model—
Unbalanced Panel 
Large Countries
Variable (11.1) (11.2) (11.3) (11.4)
Reversal 4 Percent Reversal 2 Percent
Current account deficit to GDP 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24
(4.46)* (4.51)* (5.18)* (5.20)*
Sudden stop  0.93 0.98 0.63 0.65
(1.97)** (2.09)** (1.39) (1.44)
Sudden stops in region  1.82 1.77 3.08 3.10
(1.47) (1.45) (2.72)* (2.77)*
External debt to GDP  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.16) (1.19) (1.22) (1.30)
Domestic credit growth -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
Fiscal deficit to GDP -0.003 - -0.007 -
(0.64) - (0.21) -
Initial GDP per capita -0.10 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03
(0.60) (0.56) (0.17) (0.18)
Observations 555 595 555 595
countries 36 37 36 37
Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses; explanatory variables are one-period lagged variable; coun-
try-specific dummies are included, but not reported. 
* significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 10 percent.country in question, including its economic size (that is to say,
whether it is a large country), its degree of trade openness, and the
extent to which it restricts capital mobility, and (c) have the effects of
the reversals on economic growth depended on the magnitude and
speed at which the adjustment takes place? In addressing these issues,
I emphasize the case of large countries; as a comparison, however, I do
provide results for the complete sample of countries.
Authors who have analyzed the real effects of current account rever-
sals have reached different conclusions. Milesi-Ferreti and Razin
(2000), for example, used both before-and-after analyses as well as
cross-country regressions to deal with this issue and concluded that
“reversal events seem to entail substantial changes in macroeconomic
performance between the period before and the period after the crisis
but are not systematically associated with a growth slowdown” (p. 303,
emphasis added). Edwards (2002), on the other hand, used dynamic
panel regression analysis and concluded that major current account
reversals had a negative effect on investment, and that they had “a
negative effect on GDP per capita growth, even after controlling for
investment” (p. 52).29 Debelle and Galati (2005) used a before-and-
after approach and concluded that (2 percent) reversals did not result
in a slowdown in growth, a result that also was obtained by Croke
and others (2005). Freund and Warnock (2005), on the other hand,
used a multivariate statistical approach and found that reversals have
been associated with a slowdown in economic growth. None of these
studies, however, has analyzed the potential role of the speed of
adjustment on the effects of reversals on growth.
Preliminaries
In Chart 10, I present data on (median) GDP growth per capita in
the period surrounding current account reversals. As may be seen in
this chart, in the three samples considered in this study, there is a
decline in GDP growth in the year of the reversal. This decline is
particularly pronounced in the “large countries” and “industrial
countries” samples. It is interesting to notice, however, that the drop
in the rate of GDP growth appears to be short-lived. In the “large
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countries” and “all countries” samples, there is a very sharp recovery
in growth one year after the reversal episode. Kruskal-Wallis tests,
reported in Table 10, indicate that in the reversal countries, growth is
significantly lower in the years surrounding the reversals than in a
control group of counties that have not experienced a reversal (the p-
values range from 0.07 to 0.00). 
Growth effects of current account reversals: An econometric model 
The point of departure of the econometric analysis is a two-equation
formulation for the dynamics of real GDP per capita growth of country
jin period t. Equation (3) is the long-run GDP growth equation; equa-
tion (4), on the other hand, captures the growth dynamics process.
(3) g ˜t = α + xj β +rj θ + ωj .
(4)  ∆g jt =λ[g ˜j – g jt –1] + ϕv jt + γu jt + εjt .  
g ˜ jis the long-run rate of real per capita GDP growth in country j; xj
is a vector of structural, institutional, and policy variables that deter-
mine long-run growth; rj is a vector of regional dummies; α, β, and θ
are parameters, and ωj is an error term assumed to be heteroskedastic.
In equation (3), g jt is the rate of growth of per capita GDP in country
j in period t. The terms vjt and ujt are shocks, assumed to have zero
mean, finite variance and to be uncorrelated among them. More specif-
ically, vjt is assumed to be an external terms of trade shock, while ujt
captures other shocks, including current account reversals.  ε jt  is an error
term, which is assumed to have a variance component form, and λ, ϕ,
and  γare parameters that determine the particular characteristics of the
growth process. Equation (4) has the form of an equilibrium correction
model and states that the actual rate of growth in period t will deviate
from the long-run rate of growth because of the existence of three types
of shocks: vtj, utj, and ξtj. Over time, however, the actual rate of growth
will tend to converge toward its long-run value, with the rate of conver-
gence given by λ. Parameter ϕ, in equation (4), is expected to be
positive, indicating that an improvement in the terms of trade will
result in a (temporary) acceleration in the rate of growth, and that nega-
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tive terms of trade shock are expected to have a negative effect on gjt.30
From the perspective of the current analysis, a key issue is whether
current account reversals have a negative effect on growth; that is,
whether coefficient γ is significantly negative. In the actual estimation
of equation (4), I used dummy variables for reversals. An important
question—and one that is addressed in detail in the subsection that
follows—is whether the effects of different shocks on growth are differ-
ent for countries with different structural characteristics, such as its
degree of trade and capital account openness.31
Equations (3) and (4) were estimated using a two-step procedure. In
the first step, I estimate the long-run growth equation (3) using a
cross-country data set. These data are averages for 1970-2001, and the
estimation makes a correction for heteroskedasticity. These first-stage
estimates are then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to
replace g ˜j in the equilibrium error correction model (4). In the second
step, I estimated equation (4) using generalized least squares (GLS) for
unbalanced panels; I used both random effects and fixed effects esti-
mation procedures.32 The data set used covers 157 countries, for the
1970-2001 period; not every country has data for every year, however.
See the Appendix for exact data definition and data sources. 
In estimating equation (3) for long-run per capita growth, I followed
the standard literature on growth, as summarized by Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (1995), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Dollar (1992), among
others. I assume that the rate of growth of GDP (g ˜ j) depends on a
number of structural, policy, and social variables. More specifically, I
include the following covariates: the log of initial GDP per capita; the
investment ratio; the coverage of secondary education, as a proxy for
human capital; an index of the degree of openness of the economy; the
ratio of government consumption relative to GDP; and regional
dummies. The results obtained from these first-step estimates are not
reported because of space considerations.
 In Table 12, I present the results from the second-step estimation of
the growth dynamics equation (4), when random effects were used.
The results are presented for two samples—“large countries” and
“industrial countries”—and for the two definitions of reversals
discussed above. The estimated coefficient of the growth gap is, as
expected, positive, significant, and smaller than one. The point esti-
mates are on the high side—between 0.69 and 0.78—suggesting
that, on average, deviations between long-run and actual growth get
eliminated rather quickly. For instance, according to equation (12.1),
after three years, approximately 82 percent of a unitary shock to real
GDP growth per capita will be eliminated. Also, as expected, the esti-
mated coefficients of the terms of trade shock are always positive, and
statistically significant, indicating that an improvement (deteriora-
tion) in the terms of trade results in an acceleration (de-acceleration)
in the rate of growth of real per capita GDP. 
As may be seen from Table 12, in all regressions, the coefficient of the
current account reversals variable is significantly negative, indicating that
reversals result in a deceleration of growth in both samples. For large
countries, these results suggest that, on average, a reversal 4 percent
reversal has resulted in a reduction of GDP growth of 5.25 percent in
the first year. This effect persists through time, and is eliminated grad-
ually as g converges toward g ˜j. In the case of reversal 2 percent, the
estimated negative effect is significantly at -4.3 percent. According to
these results, the negative growth effects of a “front-loaded” current
account reversal—that is, a reversal 4 percent episode—are signifi-
cantly larger than those of a more gradual reversal or a reversal 2
percent type of episode. The results for the “industrial countries”
sample are reported in equations 12.3 and 12.4 in Table 12. As may
be seen, the negative effect on growth is milder than for large coun-
tries; it is still the case, however, that a front-loaded reversal has a
more severe effect on growth than more gradual reversal episodes.
When lagged values of the reversals indicators are added to these
regressions, their coefficients turned out to be non-significant at
conventional levels. 
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 To summarize, the results presented in Table 12 are revealing and
provide some light on the costs of an eventual current account rever-
sal in the United States. Historically, large countries and industrial
countries that have gone through reversals have experienced deep
GDP growth reductions; these reductions are higher if the current
account reversal is front-loaded. These estimates indicate that, on
average, with other factors given and depending on the sample and
the definition of reversal, the decline of GDP growth per capita has
been in the range of 2.2 percent to 5.3 percent in the first year of the
adjustment. Three years after the initial adjustment, GDP growth
will still be below its long-run trend.
Extensions, endogeneity, and robustness
In this subsection, I discuss some extensions and deal with robust-
ness issues, including the potential endogeneity bias of the estimates.
More specifically, I address the following issues: (a) the effects of
terms of trade changes and (b) the role of countries’ structural char-
acteristics in determining the costs of adjustment.
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Table 12
Current Account Reversals and Growth
(Random Effects GLS Estimates)
(12.1) (12.2) (12.3) (12.4)
Large Countries Industrial Countries
Growth gap 0.69 0.70 0.77 0.79
(24.28)* (24.33)* (20.22)* (20.50)*
Change in terms of trade 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.13
(9.35)* (9.60)* (6.69)* (6.66)*
Reversal 4 percent -5.25 - -3.80 -
(9.11)* - (4.43)* -
Reversal 2 percent - -4.34 - -2.49
- (9.21)* - (4.45)*
Constant -0.25 -0.21 -0.70 -0.70
(1.99)** (1.67)*** (4.22)* (4.34)*
Observations 842 842 413 413
Countries 41 41 21 21
R-squared 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.53
Absolute value of t statistics are reported in parentheses; country-specific dummies are included, but not reported;
*significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 10 percent.252 Sebastian Edwards
Terms of trade effects
The results in Table 12 were obtained controlling for terms of trade
changes. That is, the coefficient of the reversal 4 percent and reversal 2
percent coefficients capture the effect of a current account reversal,
maintaining terms of trade constant. As discussed in the second section,
however, in large countries, external adjustment is very likely to affect
the terms of trade. The exact nature of that effect will depend on a
number of factors, including the size of the relevant elasticities and the
extent of home bias in consumption. In order to have an idea of the
effect of current account reversals allowing for international price
adjustments, I re-estimated equation (4) excluding the terms of trade
variable for the “large countries” sample. The estimated coefficients for
the reversals coefficients were smaller (in absolute terms) than those in
Table 12, indicating that when the terms of trade are allowed to adjust,
the growth effect of the reversal is less severe. That is, for large coun-
tries, the terms-of-trade adjustment following a reversal generates
offsetting forces on growth. The estimated coefficient of the reversal 4
percent is now -4.1 (it is -5.3 in Table 12). The new estimated coeffi-
cient of reversal 2 percent is now -3.6 (it was -4.4 in Table 12).
Interestingly, when the terms-of-trade variable is excluded from the
regressions for the “industrial countries” and “all countries” samples,
the coefficients of “reversal” are not affected.
Openness and the costs of adjustment
Recent studies on the economics of external adjustment have
emphasized the role of trade openness. Edwards (2004), Calvo and
others (2004), and Frankel and Cavallo (2004), among others, have
found that countries that are more open to international trade tend to
incur in a lower cost of adjustment. Most of these studies, however,
have not made a distinction between large and small countries, nor
have they distinguished between industrial and other countries. I
added two interactive regressors to equations of the type of (4). More
specifically, I included the following terms: (a) a variable that interacts
the reversals indicator with trade openness and (b) a variable that
 interacts the reversal indicator with an index of the degree of interna-
tional capital mobility. Trade openness is proxied by the fitted value
of the imports plus exports to GDP ratio obtained from a gravity
model of bilateral trade.33 The index on international capital mobil-
ity, on the other hand, was developed by Edwards (2005b), and
ranges from zero to 100, with higher numbers denoting a higher
degree of capital mobility. The results obtained are presented in Table
13. As may be seen, the coefficients of the reversal indicators continue
to be significantly negative, as in the previous analysis. However, the
variable that interacts trade openness and reversals is not significant
for large and industrial countries, indicating that for these two
groups, trade openness has not affected the way in which reversals
affect growth. However, for the complete sample, this coefficient is
significantly positive, indicating that countries that are more open to
trade have a lower cost of reversals. The coefficient for the variable
that interacts reversals with capital mobility is not significant for the
“large” and “industrial” countries sample; it is significantly negative
for the “all countries” sample (results available from the author). The
results reported in Table 13, then, suggest that the way in which
structural characteristics affect adjustment are different for different
type of countries. While openness appears to be important for small
non-industrial counties, they are not important for countries that are
large or advanced. 
Endogeneity
The results discussed above were obtained using a random effects
GLS for unbalanced panels, and under the assumption that the rever-
sal variable is exogenous. It is possible, however, that whether a
reversal takes place is affected by growth performance, and, thus, is
endogenously determined. In order to deal with this issue, I have re-
estimated equation (4) using an instrumental variables GLS panel
procedure. In the estimation, the following instruments were used:
(a) the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP lagged one and
two periods; (b) a lagged sudden-stop dummy that takes the value of
one if the country in question has experienced a sudden stop in the
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previous year; (c) an index that measures the relative occurrence of
sudden stops in the country’s region (excluding the country itself)
during that particular year—this variable captures the effect of
“regional contagion”; (d) the one-year lagged external gross debt over
GDP ratio; (e) the ratio of net international reserves to GDP, lagged
one year; (f) the one-year lagged rate of growth of domestic credit; (g)
the country’s initial GDP per capita (in logs). The results obtained, not
presented here because of space considerations, show that the coeffi-
cients of the reversal indicators are significantly negative, confirming
that historically current account reversals have had a negative effect on
growth. The absolute values of the estimated coefficients, however, are
larger than those obtained when random effects GLS were used.
(13.1) (13.2) (13.3) (13.4)
Large Countries Industrial Countries
Growth gap 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.76
(25.22)* (25.48)* (25.22)* (25.48)*
Change in terms of trade 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
(8.31)* (8.48)* (8.31)* (8.48)*
Reversal 4% -2.88 - -2.88 -
(1.86)*** - (1.86)*** -
Reversal 4% * trade openness -0.01 -0.01
(0.47) (0.47)
Reversal 4% * capital mobility -0.05 -0.05
(1.57) (1.57)
Reversal 2% - -4.11 - -4.11
- (3.20)* - (3.20)*
Reversal 2% * trade openness -0.04 -0.04
(1.31) (1.31)
Reversal 2% * capital mobility -0.01 -0.01
(0.19) (0.19)
Constant -0.20 -0.14 -0.20 -0.14
(1.62) (1.16) (1.62) (1.16)
Observations 836 836 413 413
Countries 41 41 21 21
R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.53
Absolute value of t statistics are reported in parentheses; country-specific dummies are included, but not reported;
*significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 10 percent.
Table 13
Current Account Reversals, Trade Openness, Capital Mobility,
and Growth
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Alternative indicators of current account reversals
Throughout the analysis, I have used reversal indicators that
constrain the current account deficit adjustment to be at least 5
percent of GDP in a three-year period. As a way of gaining additional
insights into the effects of current account reversals, in Table 14, I
present results obtained when two alternative reversal indicators are
used: reversal 14 is defined as an episode where the current account
deficit declines in at least 4 percent in one year, independently of
what happens in the years to come. “reversal 12,” on the other hand,
is defined as an episode where the current account deficit declines in
at least 2 percent in one year, independently of whether the deficit
continues to decline in the following years. These two new variables,
then, provide “less demanding” definitions of reversals. The results in
Table 14 confirm those discussed above. They show that reversals
have had a negative effect on growth in all three samples. In addition,
these results indicate that the magnitude of the reversal matters;
deeper reversals (4 percent in one year) have a more negative effect on
growth than milder reversals (2 percent in one year). Also, a compar-
ison between the results in Tables 12 and 14 suggest that the effects
on growth of sustained reversals have a greater effect on growth. 
Robustness and other extensions
In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also estimated
several versions of equation (4) for the “large countries” sample. In one
of these exercises, I introduced lagged values of the reversal indicators
as additional regressors. The results obtained—available on request—
show that lagged values of these indexes were not significant at
conventional levels. I also varied the definition of “large countries;” the
main message of the results, however, is not affected by the sample.
The U.S. current account reversal of 1987-1991
Between 1987 and 1991, the U.S. current account deficit experi-
enced a major reversal. In the third quarter of 1987, the deficit stood at
3.7 percent, a figure that then was considered to be exceptionally high.
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Table 14
Alternative Indicators of Current Account Reversals and Growth
(Random Effects GLS Estimates)
(14.1) (14.2) (14.3) (14.4)
Large Countries Industrial Countries
Growth gap 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.79
(25.33)* (25.36)* (20.72)* (20.80)*
Change in terms of trade 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14
(10.30)* (10.63)* (6.64)* (7.31)*
Reversal 14 -4.12 - -3.58 -
(9.34)* - (5.46)* -
Reversal 12 - -2.85 - -1.70
- (9.08)* - (5.11)*
Constant -0.21 -0.09 -0.65 -0.63
(1.70)** (0.67) (4.02)* (3.89)*
Observations 846 846 416 416
Countries 41 41 21 21
R-squared 0.47 0.46 0.54 0.54
Absolute value of t statistics are reported in parentheses; country-specific dummies are included, but not reported;
*significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 10 percent.
During the next three years, the deficit declined gradually, and in the
fourth quarter of 1990, it was 1 percent of GDP. During the next two
quarters, and as a result of foreign countries’ contributions to financing
of the Gulf War, the current account briefly posted a surplus of 0.8
percent of GDP. The 1987-1991 adjustment process was accompanied
by a major depreciation of the U.S. dollar. The dollar began to lose
value in the second quarter of 1985, almost two years before the current
account deficit began its turnaround.34 Although this episode does not
qualify as a “reversal” in the empirical analysis presented in the preced-
ing sections, it is the closest to a major current account adjustment that
the United States has experienced in modern times. In this section, I
analyze the behavior of some key economic variables in the period
surrounding this adjustment.
In Chart 11, I present quarterly data for the period 1983-1993 for:
(a) the current account balance; (b) the trade-weighted real exchange
rate index for the U.S. dollar; (c) the cyclical component of real GDP;
and (d) the cyclical component of the rate of unemployment.35 In
Chart 12, I present monthly data for the same period (1983-1993)
for: (a) the rate of inflation; (b) the federal funds interest rate; and (c)
the 10-year Treasury Note interest rate. In both charts, I have shaded
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the period October 1987-June 1991, which corresponds to the actual
period when the current account deficit declined. From an analytical
point of view, however, we also are interested in the behavior of these
key variables in the period immediately preceding and immediately
following the adjustment. The picture that emerges from these charts
may be summarized as follows:
• During the adjustment process, the U.S. dollar depreciated
significantly in real terms. Between the second quarter of 1985
and the second quarter of 1991, the dollar lost 30 percent of its
value in real trade-weighted terms. Between the third quarter of
1987 and the second quarter of 1991—the shaded period in
Charts 11 and 12—the trade-weighted dollar lost 9.5 percent of
its value.
• During the early part of the adjustment, there was no decline in
GDP, nor was there an increase in unemployment. However,
Chart 11
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during the latter part of the adjustment—starting in the second
quarter of 1990—there was a decline in GDP and a marked
increase in unemployment. Indeed, as may be seen from Chart
11, GDP stayed below its stochastic trend well into 1993;
unemployment was above its own trend until early 1994.
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, in
August of 1990, the United States entered into a recession that
lasted until March of 1991.36
• During the first part of the adjustment, there was a sharp increase
in the federal funds interest rate. In October 1986, the federal
funds rate was 5.85 percent; by March 1989 it had increased by
400 basis points to 9.85 percent. In June 1989, the Fed cut rates
by 25 basis points, and began a period of interest rate reduction.
By the end of the adjustment, in June 1991, the federal funds rate
stood at 5.9 percent.
• The yield on the 10-year Treasury Note increased significantly in
the months preceding the actual current account adjustment. The
yield went from 7.1 percent in January 1987, to 9.4 percent in
September of that year—an increase of 230 basis points. From
that time and until March 1989, the yield on the 10-year Note
moved between 9 percent and 9.4 percent. Starting in April
1989, long-term interest rates began to fall, reaching 8 percent in
April 1991. In June 1993, two years after the current account
adjustment had ended, the long-tem interest rate was 6 percent.
The yield curve became inverted in January 1989 and stayed
inverted until January 1990.  
• In the period preceding the adjustment, there was an increase in
inflation. This continued to exhibit an upward trend until late
1990, when it reached 6 percent. 
Two other features of the 1987-1991 current account adjustment
episode are worth noting. First, during that period, the U.S. terms of
trade (prices of exports over imports) did not experience significant
changes. And second, during this adjustment episode, the actual exter-
nal adjustment took place through a decline in three categories of
capital inflows: (a) foreigners’ net purchases of private securities (bonds
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Note Interest Rateand equities), (b) foreign central banks’ net purchases of treasury secu-
rities, and (c) net bank credit. (See Chart 13 for the composition of
current account financing for the period 1980-1993.)
The 1987-1991 current account adjustment in the United States was
significant, but gradual. And although the episode does not qualify as
a “current account” reversal, as defined in the third section of this paper,
it does provide some useful information. As Charts 11 and 12 show,
this adjustment was not characterized by a traumatic collapse in output.
However, its general pattern had many similarities with the major
current account reversals analyzed in the third and fourth sections of
this paper. The 1987-1991 adjustment episode in the United States was
characterized by: (a) a steep depreciation of the U.S. dollar; (b) an
increase in inflation; (c) higher interest rates—the fed funds rate
increased through the first half of the adjustment, while the 10-year rate
increased in the months prior to the beginning of the actual adjust-
ment; (d) a decline in GDP below trend toward the latter part of the
adjustment (in fact, the United States entered into a recession while the
adjustment was taking place); and (e) an increase in the rate of unem-
ployment above trend, during the final quarters of the adjustment.  
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have illustrated the uniqueness of the current U.S.
external situation. As shown in the second section, never in the history
of modern economics has a large industrial country run persistent
current account deficits of the magnitude posted by the United States
since 2000. This significant increase in the U.S. current account
deficit may be explained by the increase in the international demand
for U.S. securities during the last few years.37 The future of the U.S.
current account—and, thus, of the U.S. dollar—depends on whether
foreign investors will continue to add U.S. assets to their investment
portfolios. However, even under optimistic scenarios, the U.S. current
account deficit will have to go through a significant reversal at some
point in time.
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 In order to have an idea of the possible consequences of this type of
adjustment, I have analyzed the international evidence on current
account reversals. The results from this empirical investigation indicate
that major current account reversals have tended to result in large
declines in GDP growth. Historically, large countries that have gone
through major reversals have experienced deep GDP growth reduc-
tions. Three years after the initial adjustment, GDP growth still will be
below its long-run trend. An analysis of the U.S. current account
adjustment of 1987-1991 shows that this episode had many similari-
ties with the major current account reversals discussed in this paper.
________________
Author’s note: The author thanks Ed Leamer for helpful discussions and Roberto Alvarez for
his excellent assistance.
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Variable Definition Source
Current account Reduction in the current account deficit of at  Author’s elaboration based on data of 
reversal 4 percent least 4 percent of GDP in one year and 5  current account deficit 
percent accumulated in three years. (World Development Indicators).
Initial balance has to be a deficit.
Current account  Reduction in the current account deficit of at  Author’s elaboration based on data of 
reversal 2 percent least 4 percent of GDP in one year and 5  current account deficit
percent accumulated in three years. Initial  (World Development Indicators).
balance has to be a deficit.
Current account  Reduction in the current account deficit of  Author’s elaboration based on data of
reversal 14 at least 4 percent of GDP in one year.  current account deficit
Initial balance has to be a deficit. (World Development Indicators).
Current account  Reduction in the current account deficit of at least  Author’s elaboration based on data of
reversal 12 2 percent of GDP in one year. Initial balance has to  current account deficit
be a deficit. (World Development Indicators).
Sudden stop Reduction of net capital inflows of at least 5 percent  Author’s elaboration based on data of
of GDP in one year. The country in question must  current account deficit
have received an inflow of capital larger to its   (World Development Indicators).
region’s third quartile during the previous two years 
prior to the sudden stop. 
Nominal exchange  Local currency units per dollar. International Financial Statistics, IMF.
rate
Effective real  Trade-weighted real exchange rate.  International Financial Statistics, IMF.
exchange rate 
Terms of trade Change in terms-of-trade exports as capacity to  World Development Indicators.
import (constant LCU).
Reserves to GDP  Net international reserves over GDP. World Development Indicators.
Domestic  Annual growth rate of domestic credit. World Development Indicators.
credit growth 
External debt  Total external debt over GDP. World Development Indicators.
to GDP
Fiscal deficit to  Overall budget to GDP.  World Development Indicators.
GDP
GDP per capita GDP per capita in 1995 U.S. dollars. World Development Indicators.
Index of capital  Index: (low mobility) to 100 (high mobility). Edwards (2005b).
mobility
Trade openness Predicted trade from bilateral gravity equation. Author’s elaboration.
Appendix
Description of DataEndnotes
1Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004, 2005).
2 See, for example, Barry Eichengreen’s op-ed piece in the Dec. 21, 2004, issue of
the Financial Times.
3Parts of this paper draw partially on my previous research on the current account
and external adjustment. The results reported here, however, differ from previous
analyses in several respects, including the data set, the definition of “reversal,” the
emphasis on large and industrial countries, and the statistical techniques used.
4See also Croke, Kamin, and Leduc (2005); Debelle and Galati (2005); Freund
and Warnock (2005); Adalet and Eichengreen (2005); and Edwards (2004, 2005).
5In Edwards (2004), I used a smaller data set to investigate reversals in emerging
countries. In Edwards (2005a), I included the case of industrial countries. However,
I did not analyze whether the magnitude and speed of the reversal affected the
nature of the associated costs.
6Parts of this section draw on Edwards (2005a).
7This is the Federal Reserve RER index.
8Mann (2004) shows that most of the U.S. trade deficit is explained by a deficit
in automobiles and consumer goods.
9See, for example, Martin Wolf’s Oct. 1, 2003, article in the Financial Times,
“Funding America’s Recovery is a Very Dangerous Game,” p. 15. 
10See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) and Mussa (2004).
11Stephen Roach from Morgan Stanley has been a forceful supporter of this view.
12That is, the global “savings glut” identified by Bernanke (2005) would have to
be reversed. See also Chairman Greenspan’s speech to the International Monetary
Conference in Beijing, June 6, 2005.
13Notice that the thresholds for defining high deficits are year- and region-
specific. That is, for every year there is a different threshold for each region.
14For an econometric analysis of current account deficits persistence, see Edwards
(2004). See also Taylor (2002).
15For the United States, the data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For
the other countries, the data are, until 1997, from the Lane and Milessi-Ferreti
(2001) data set. I have updated them using current account balance data. Notice
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 that the updated figures should be interpreted with a grain of salt, as I have not
corrected them for valuation effects.
16This calculation assumes a 6 percent rate of growth of nominal GDP going forward. 
17It should be noted that the study by Crocke and others (2005), as well as those
by Debelle and Galalti (2005) and Freund and Warnok (2005), have used a rather
mild definition of reversal, consisting of a reduction in the current account deficit
of 2 percent of GDP in one year.
18In Edwards (2004), I used a smaller data set to investigate reversals in emerging
countries. In that paper, however, I did not consider the experience of large or industrial
countries with reversals. Also, in that paper, I used very simple framework for analyzing
growth. In contrast, in this section, I use a two-step dynamic of growth approach.  
19In both cases, the timing of the reversal is recorded as the year when the episode
begins. Also, for a particular episode to classify as a current account deficit reversal,
the initial balance has to be indeed a deficit. 
20For recent papers, see Calvo and others (2004) and Frankel and Cavallo (2004).
For capital flows and crises, see Eichengreen (2003).
21In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative defi-
nitions of sudden stops, which considered a reduction in inflows of 3 percent and 7
percent of GDP in one year. Because of  space considerations, however, I don’t report
detailed results using these definitions.
22For the relationship between depreciations and crises, see Eichengreen and
others (1996).
23See Adalet and Eichengreen (2005).
24The tests are performed on the changes in the variables of interest during two time
spans: between three years before and three years after the reversals, and between one
year before and the year of the reversal. Three different control groups were
constructed, one for each sample.
25These χ2 tests refer to accumulated exchange rate changes in the years
surrounding a reversal.
26Gagnon (2005) analyzes behavior of interest rates in the aftermath of currency
crises. He does not concentrate on reversals, however. 
27See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000),
and Edwards (2002).
28Results for the other two samples of countries are quite similar; they are not
reported here because of space considerations.
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 29In a recent paper, Guidotti and others (2004) consider the role of openness in
an analysis of imports and exports behavior in the aftermath of a reversal. See also
Frankel and Cavallo (2004).
30See Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2004) for details.
31On capital account liberalization and growth, see Eichengreen and Leblang (2003).
32Because of space considerations, only the random effect results are reported.
33The use of gravity trade equations to generate instruments in panel estimation
has been pioneered by Jeff Frankel. See, for example, Frankel and Cavallo (2004).
34This two-year lag coincides with the conventional wisdom of the time it takes
a dollar depreciation to affect the current account. 
35These cyclical components were computed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter on
the complete time series from 1951 through 2005. 
36I am not implying necessarily causality in this description of the data.
37This, in turn, is a manifestation of the “global savings glut.”
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